The drift in the transatlantic relationship: causes of growing European anti-Americanism by Sivy, Rebecca
  
 
THE DRIFT IN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP: CAUSES OF GROWING 
EUROPEAN ANTI-AMERICANISM 
 
 
 
 
Rebecca Sivy 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the 
Department of Political Science. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2007 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Milada Vachudova 
John Stephens  
Donald Searing 
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
REBECCA SIVY: The Drift in the Transatlantic Relationship: Causes of Growing  
European Anti-Americanism 
(Under the direction of Milada Vachudova) 
 
Since the end of WWII, the prevalence and salience of anti-Americanism has 
waxed and waned across Europe.  However, this sentiment has never permeated 
the masses—until recently.  At the turn of the 21st century, European anti-
Americanism drastically rises.  Investigations into the declining American popularity 
have revealed record high disapproval ratings for the US.  Europeans are finding the 
US and Americans more unfavorable and untrustworthy.  What could have caused 
of such a drastic shift?  The Bush administration has always been highly unpopular 
throughout Europe.  Therefore, an examination of its foreign policy initiatives and 
public diplomacy efforts could shed some light on not only the causes of rising anti-
Americanism, but also the permanence of this shift.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The entering of the United States into WWII to fight alongside the allies 
marked the beginning of a continued American presence on the European continent.  
The US poured resources into Europe through the Marshall Plan to help rebuild 
destitute Western Europe.  While the US rose to power in the West, the Soviet 
menace ascended in the East.  In order to contain this threat, the Americans needed 
to form a close partnership with Western Europe.  During the Cold War, the US 
increased its impact by extending its military capabilities, political clout, and cultural 
influence.  Europe was a strategic location for the Americans—the front lines in the 
fight against the Soviet Union.  However, once the Berlin Wall fell, it seemed as 
though America no longer needed to maintain its close relationship with Europe.   
Yet the US continued to reach out to its partners across the Atlantic 
throughout the 1990s.  During this period, the EU and the US were able to focus 
their energy on domestic issues, such as Americans promoting economic growth 
during the technology “dot.com” boom, and Europeans pursuing further integration 
through the Economic and Monetary Union.  Even though the US and the EU made 
their own economic policies a top priority, they both still highly valued and 
understood the importance of a close transatlantic relationship.  This relationship 
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had held a relatively positive and prominent place in the public opinions of both 
Americans and Europeans not only during the Cold War, but also throughout the 
post-Cold War period.  The general European population felt favorable towards the 
US and its leadership in world affairs.  Even if anti-American sentiment waxed and 
waned over time, it never became the majority opinion.  
However, this all changed after 9/11 when President Bush pursued an 
aggressive and unilateral war against terrorism.  Positive feelings in European public 
opinion were replaced with negative net attitudes for the first time in history.  While 
some scholars and politicians believe this downturn was simply a natural fluctuation 
in public opinion, others found it problematic to the future of the transatlantic 
relationship.  In this thesis, I identify causes of this recent rise in anti-Americanism 
and explain how this increase in negative opinion is different from changes in 
previous periods. 
I have divided my thesis into four parts.  The first section outlines the results 
of various public opinion surveys.  I analyze the popularity of the US and Americans 
from the end of the WWII until today.  This overview provides insight into the recent 
rise of anti-Americanism.   
In the second section, I define anti-Americanism—its origins, its complexity, 
and its significance.  Then I explain the historical pervasiveness of this attitude by 
focusing on three key periods: the Cold War era (1945-1989); the post-Cold War era 
(1989-2000); and, the threat of terrorism in the 21st century.  The purpose of this 
section is to offer a comprehensive background on European anti-Americanism. 
  3 
Understanding the historical context makes the difference between former and 
contemporary anti-American sentiment more apparent. 
The third section focuses on the possible causes of rising anti-Americanism 
since 2000.  Since foreign policy exerts the strongest influence on public opinion, I 
first examine the Bush Administration’s foreign policy.  Although many of his policies 
were unpopular, I have chosen to focus on three specific cases: the Bush 
administration’s stance on climate change as evidenced by its rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol; the disregard of the UN as seen by the unilateral US invasion of Iraq; and, 
the human rights violations as seen by the inhumane treatment at Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo, and CIA cells throughout the world.  The purpose of focusing on these 
specific cases is to demonstrate how negative public opinion across Europe is 
becoming deeper and stronger.  Then I turn to the second strongest influencer of 
public opinion—public diplomacy.  I briefly explain the history of public diplomacy 
efforts throughout Europe during the Cold War and discuss the implications of the 
abolition of the USIA and evolution of public diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.  
The purpose of this section is to explore a contributing factor to the rising anti-
American sentiment. 
The final section offers concluding remarks and possible implications of this 
change in public opinion. The purpose of this final section is to solidify my argument 
that European public opinion has been permanently altered, and introduce arising 
implications of this shift on the transatlantic relationship.     
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
TRENDS IN ANTI-AMERICANISM: ANALYZING OPINION POLLS, 1945 TO 2007 
 
Before developing my argument, I would like to present the facts about anti-
Americanism in European public opinion.  This attitude is complex and variable, and 
historically, it has permeated only a small segment of the European population.  
Public opinion polls illustrate overall favorable attitudes towards the US and 
Americans throughout the 20th century. Yet these trends have changed since 2000. 
Negative feelings seem to be deepening and intensifying instead of bouncing back.  
In this overview, I offer concrete examples from recent surveys, which confirm this 
change in public opinion and illustrate how the recent rise in anti-Americanism is 
different from previous periods.   
Looking first at this attitude’s complexity and variability, anti-Americanism has 
three major characteristics.  The first characteristic1 is how this attitude varies across 
countries.  In order to understand a particular country’s overall level of anti-American 
sentiment, Pierangelo Isernia has analyzed several public opinion surveys from 
1954 to 2004 (2007).  In his analysis, he looks at the trends in net attitudes for a 
given country over the given time period.  The higher overall level of percentage 
points indicates greater favorability of the US.  His investigation reveals the following 
                                                 
1 “Characteristics of anti-Americanism” refers to those traits or patterns that are noticeable in an 
analysis of public opinion polls.  
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averages: 50 points for Germany, 48 points for Italy, 43 points for Great Britain, and 
20 points for France (Isernia 2007).  On one end of the spectrum, Germany registers 
the highest overall favorability rating of the US (and the lowest prevalence of anti-
Americanism) from 1954 to 2004.  On the other end of the spectrum, France 
demonstrates lower favorability rating over time, which confirms the greater 
prevalence of anti-American sentiment in France.  
While anti-Americanism varies across countries, its second characteristic is 
how it also fluctuates over time.  For majority of the 20th century, the US was highly 
regarded by Europeans; however, at times, the US dropped in popularity and these 
dips are not arbitrary.  Instead, a decrease in the US favorability ratings can usually 
be correlated with an unpopular US foreign policy or a transatlantic crisis.  For 
example, drops in public opinions were registered during the Suez crisis in the late 
1950s, the unpopular Vietnam War in the late 1960s, and Reagan’s missile policy in 
the early 1980s.  Even though these three examples demonstrate decreasing 
favorability ratings, each example demonstrates increasing positive attitudes once 
the crisis is resolved.      
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Figure 1 illustrates all three characteristics of anti-Americanism—variability 
across countries, fluctuations over time, and a positive average.  Since the end of 
WWII, Europeans have held positive opinions about the US and Americans.  This 
figure shows these positive averages for France, Germany, and Great Britain. 
However, since the turn of the 21st century, all three countries demonstrate negative 
net opinions.  In order to understand this historic change, several worldwide polls 
have been conducted and their results paint a bleak picture.  Global public opinion 
has grown increasingly negative about the US and Americans. 
In order to understand the source of this rising anti-American sentiment, these 
polls have tested various indicators.  The first indicator of rising anti-Americanism 
FIGURE 1 
 
Source: Johnston, Gregory and Leonard Ray.  (2007).  “European Anti-Americanism and Choices 
for a European Defense Policy”, in PS Online, January 2007: 85-91.   
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comes from an analysis of the US favorability rating.  One survey asks whether or 
not the participant has favorable opinions of the US.  The results2 for 1999/2000 
indicated positive responses: Great Britain with 83 percent, France with 62 percent, 
Germany with 78 percent, and Spain with 50 percent. However, these numbers drop 
steadily in the following years.  As seen in Figure 2, the majority of Western 
Europeans viewed the US unfavorably by 2006.   
 
FIGURE 2 
 
Source: Pew Global Studies 2006 
 
                                                 
2 The data for the 1999/2000 survey results comes from the Office of Research at the US State 
Department, as indicated on the chart for the Pew Global Attitudes Project.  
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Along with declining favorability of the US, Europeans have also indicated a 
rising dislike for the American people—the second indictor for rising anti-
Americanism.  Figure 3 illustrates this decline in positive opinions from 2002 to 2006.  
However, these declines are not as dramatic as the declines in public opinion for the 
US.  The majority still view Americans positively.  
 
FIGURE 3 
 
Source: Pew Global Studies 2006 
 
Even though declines in the positive opinions about the US and Americans 
have occurred recently, the significance of these drops cannot be understood unless 
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these averages are put into an historical context.  Survey results3 reveal that 
respondents from Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy favored the US and 
Americans almost equally in 1958.  In contrast, a similar poll from 2002 uncovers 
greater differences, with favorability of the US (65 percent) lower than favorability of 
Americans (73 percent) (Isneria 2007).  Figure 4 illustrates not only greater 
disparities in favorability between the US and Americans, but also the increases in 
unfavorable attitudes in more recent opinions. 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
Source: Isernia 2007 
                                                 
3 This information had been obtained by analyzing two different surveys (USIA XX-11 for 1958 and 
Pew Global Attitudes survey for 2002).  While the USIA survey offered “Fair” as an answer, the Pew 
Global Attitudes survey did not.  Also, the “don’t know” response has been left out.    
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Investigating the recent declines in favorable opinion, Pew Global Studies 
asked respondents to identify the source of America’s problem.  The results indicate 
that vast majorities in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands 
believe the cause is President Bush, while very few find America (in general) to be 
the issue.  In fact, a low regard for President Bush is heavily correlated with an 
unfavorable rating for the US, more than is any other attitude or opinion tested in the 
Pew Global Attitudes Project surveys (Pew Global Studies 2005).  The views about 
US leadership decline rapidly from 2002 to 2007. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority 
of Europeans find the US playing a leading role in world affairs to be undesirable; 
and, even more undesired throughout this time period is President Bush.   
From the end of WWII until the turn of the 21st century, a closer examination 
of public opinion surveys has revealed some interesting facts:  first, each decrease 
in popular opinion towards America can be linked to a specific and controversial 
world event; second, public opinion has always rebounded after the incident was 
resolved; and, third, even when decreases have occurred, the majority opinion 
remained positive.  However, since 2002, the average opinion becomes negative.  
This historic downturn is linked to the overwhelming unpopularity of President Bush.  
With these facts established, I move to the second part of the thesis, which explores 
the complexity of anti-American attitudes and their involvement in the transatlantic 
relationship. 
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FIGURE 5 
 
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORY OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE  
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP 
 
As the analysis of public opinion surveys has revealed, European anti-
Americanism is a complex attitude, which varies between countries and fluctuates 
over time.  Even though this attitude has played a role in politics since the end of 
WWII, it has only been since the turn of the 21st century that it has captured the 
attention of mainstream European public opinion. To understand its historical 
context, I turn to an examination of anti-Americanism.  My understanding of this 
sentiment has been shaped by Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane’s 
typologies and by Andrei S. Markovits’ historical narrative of anti-Americanism.  
Later in this thesis, I will argue that the activities of the Bush administration have 
caused a substantial number of European citizens to distrust the US, though it has 
not yet created bias against the US.     
  
Defining Anti-Americanism 
To understand what encompasses this mood or attitude, Markovits cites a 
clear definition offered by Paul Hollander4:  
Anti-Americanism is a predisposition to hostility towards the United States and American 
society, a relentless critical impulse towards American social, economic, and political 
                                                 
4 Paul Hollander offered this definition in his book, Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 
1965-1990.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).  Pg. 339.   
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institutions, traditions, and values; it entails an aversion to American culture in particular and 
its influence abroad, often also contempt for the American national character and dislike of 
American people, manners, behavior, dress, and so on; rejection of American foreign policy 
and a firm belief in the malignity of American influence and presence anywhere in the world. 
(2007: 17)   
 
Those who process any aspect of the US in a negative way hold anti-American 
sentiments.   
Since anti-Americanism is a complicated attitude, it is not surprising that 
negative assessments vary in intensity.  This difficult distinction between simple 
opinions and deep biases can be understood by analyzing the levels of distrust 
(Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  Beginning at the lowest level, opinions are 
expressed when a group holds negative attitudes about an American value or US 
policy.  However, this reaction is contained to a specific situation.  
The next level of intensity is distrust.  If a group continues to experience 
negative opinions about US policies and American values over an extended period 
of time, this group develops distrust.  At this stage, governments are likely to 
demand more evidence or compensation before they are willing to support US 
policies (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  The negative reactions are no longer 
completely associated with a specific instance. 
Finally, prolonged distrust plants the seeds of biases.  An unbiased group 
could attribute bad policies to a specific situation, but a biased group processes the 
information differently and is more likely to attribute bad policies to essential features 
of the US (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  Since these groups have the tendency 
to discount possible favorable information, it makes negative information more 
salient.  Biased negative attitudes could potentially become entrenched in societies, 
which would have detrimental consequences for US policymakers.   
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Since the prominence and salience of anti-Americanism have been known to 
wax and wane over time, it is not surprising that this complex attitude has two 
distinguishable historical types: elitist anti-Americanism and legacy anti-
Americanism.  Elitist anti-Americanism boasts a long history of scorning the US.  
Elites throughout Europe have looked down on Americans for their lack of culture, 
and their ignorance of and isolation from world affairs.  These feelings have 
remained relatively stable over time (Markovits 2007).  However, even though this 
type of anti-Americanism has held its place in European public opinion since the 
creation of America, it has never been detrimental to the success of US foreign 
policy.  
As for the second historical type, legacy anti-Americanism stems from 
resentment of past wrongs committed by the US towards the respondent’s nation.  
Examples can be found in Spain and Greece, where both experienced American 
intervention on the side of the Right in their civil wars (Katzenstein and Keohane 
2007c).  On one hand, this form is unlike elitist anti-Americanism because it 
diminishes over time; however, on the other, it is similar because it also has little 
effect on the successful implementation of US policy.      
While these two forms of anti-Americanism have historically been prominent 
in Europe, the new surges of anti-American sentiment have not fit into these 
categories.  This has led Katzenstein and Keohane to develop a more defined 
typology, which encompasses the new types of anti-Americanism.  In their 
categorization, they evaluate how well a subject (either individual or group) relates to 
the US and its values.  On the positive side, subjects identify themselves well with 
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American values; on the negative side, subjects identify themselves in opposition or 
even hostile to the US.  This typology is broken down into four specific types: liberal 
anti-Americanism, social anti-Americanism, sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, 
and radical anti-Americanism (2007c). 
 
The first type is the liberal anti-Americanism, which is prevalent in liberal 
societies of advanced industrialized nations (former British colonies).  Even though 
liberals strongly identify themselves with America, they are also very critical of the 
US when its actions are not consistent with its professed values (Katzenstein and 
 
Table 1
Positive: 1) Pro-American 2) Critique of hypocrisy
Liberal anti-Americanism
3) Ambivalence 4) Severe criticism
Latent social Anti-Americanism
Intense social anti-
Americanism
5) Negative feelings but not too 
intense; unlikely to lead to action 
6) Intense negative feelings; 
more likely to lead to action
Latent sovereign-nationalist 
anti-Americanism
Intense sovereign-nationalist 
anti-Americanism
Negative:
7) Negative and more intense 
than 5, but less than 6 due to 
lack of fear
8) Very negative and intense; 
likely to lead to action, violent or 
nonviolent
Latent radical anti-
Americanism
Mobilized radical anti-
Americanism
Source: Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c
Subject associates 
herself with what she 
considers US practices
Subject opposes what 
she considers US 
practices
Typologies of Anti-Americanism
Degree of fear that the US will adversely affect one's own 
society
LOW HIGH
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Keohane 2007c).  This perceived hypocrisy has the potential to reduce the support 
of US policy.  Liberal anti-Americanism would never generate an attack on the US.   
Social anti-Americanism is the second type, which is prevalent in countries 
with social and Christian democratic welfare states (continental Europe and 
Scandinavia). Deriving from a values gap, those with social anti-Americanism find 
the US to be less desirable and flawed because it does not have social protections 
or market restraints, allows the death penalty, and does not respect international 
treaties (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c). Despite the differences, these nations 
and the US share broad democratic values.   
The third type is sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, which focuses on 
political power.  This group has three variations: nationalism, sovereignty, and 
exercise of state power (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  Those who focus on 
nationalism attach great importance to collective national identities, often finding it to 
be one of the most important values.  The second variation is sovereignty, which 
means that the nation wants to have control over its own state, and control over its 
international involvement.  This type is less common in Europe since most European 
polities have not only achieved self-rule, but also ruled others. Finally, the third 
variation represents the desire of a nation to reinforce its position as a great power.  
These nations define themselves in opposition to dominant states—the US 
(Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  From a more general perspective, sovereign-
nationalist anti-Americanism resonates in countries with strong state traditions, and 
those that view US actions as detrimental to nationalism, sovereignty, or exercise of 
state power. 
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Radical anti-Americanism is the fourth type, which is characteristic of Marxist-
Leninist states such as the Soviet Union, North Korea, and many Islamic states.  Not 
only is this group unable to identify with any aspect of America, but also despises 
almost all aspects.  According to this group, American economic and political power 
relations ensure that US actions will be hostile to the development and observance 
of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world (Katzenstein and 
Keohane 2007c).  Even though not all radical anti-Americans advocate violence, all 
argue for the weakening, destruction, or transformation of the political and economic 
institutions of the US.   
Even though this typology helps delineate the various categories of anti-
Americanism, none of these groups are homogeneous within a given society.  A 
mixture of attitudes about the US can be present within any country.  Furthermore, 
the different types are not mutually exclusive.  On the contrary, several of them 
bleed into one another. Katzenstein and Keohane note that some of the most 
interesting situations come from those that have more than one form of anti-
Americanism at work (2007c).   
The complexity of the various categories illustrates how multidimensional anti-
Americanism truly is.  Some argue this multidimensionality stems from America’s 
diversity.  The US represents a variety of ideals, which can be contradictory at times.  
Examples of these tensions include: intensely secular and intensely religious, 
unilateralist and multilateralist, statist and antistatist (Keohane and Katzenstein 
2007a).  The American system can be acclaimed and assailed for various reasons 
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and has the ability to be loved and hated at the same time—making anti-
Americanism difficult to define, understand, and counter.      
In order to combat this attitude, the complex layers and variations of anti-
American sentiment must be peeled away.  At its core, the negative opinions can be 
attributed to two key aspects—reactions to what America does and reactions to what 
America is.  In regards to the first and more ephemeral aspect, US foreign policy 
represents the actions of the government.  On the other and more fundamental 
aspect, the characteristics and values extolled by Americans represent the American 
way of life.  In both cases, negative views can create anti-American sentiment and 
have been the target in recent debates.  
The rising anti-Americanism has not only caught the attention of public 
opinion polls, but also sparked debates between the elites of the American Left and 
the American Right.  From the Left’s perspective, the recent rise reflects reactions to 
unpopular foreign polices.  For example, negative opinions were at their highest 
levels right before the Iraq War.  From the American Right’s perspective, the rising 
anti-Americanism can be attributed to the world hating what is good about the US—
its values of freedom and democracy (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  In their 
opinion, if the US firmly pursues sound policies, favorable opinion will follow. 
According to the Right, the negative attitudes are directed at what America is 
rather than foreign policy.  Therefore, no changes could be (or should be) made 
reduce negative attitudes.  However, the American Left views the rise in negative 
sentiment very differently.  They believe resentment is the result of what America 
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does rather than American society overall (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  
Therefore, once the US foreign policy changes, the negatives attitudes will diminish.   
Yet policy has not changed and the negative feelings appear to be growing 
stronger.  From the American Left’s perspective, these new expressions of anti-
Americanism reveal a deeper negative attitude—distrust.  The world dislikes the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy objectives and distrusts its leadership in world 
affairs.  From the American Right’s perspective, the growing dislike is simply out of 
jealousy and hatred of American values.   
While some would agree with the Right’s view on this attitude, Katzenstein 
and Keohane point out that this view overestimates the resentment of American 
power and the hatred of American values and overlooks the “political salience of the 
distrust that American actions can create” (2007c: 10).  Furthermore, if the Right’s 
view had been correct about the hatred of American values, the rise in anti-
Americanism should have erupted after the Soviet Union collapsed.  Instead, the US 
remained broadly popular until 2002.   
As for the Left, the fact is that anti-Americanism, as measured by polls, 
reflects opinion (not distrust) and is closely tied to US policy (Katzenstein and 
Keohane 2007c).  So if rising anti-Americanism is only simple opinion, why should it 
be studied and analyzed? It should be examined and the history of anti-Americanism 
should be investigated to see if these negative opinions are different from past 
periods of negative opinions.   
Regardless of whether or not the rising anti-Americanism is linked to policy or 
innate dislike of the American culture, the growing negativity creates a very real 
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threat to the success of US foreign policy.  This growing threat is what has triggered 
the study and analysis of this complex attitude.  As this section has illustrated, anti-
Americanism is a multidimensional value, which holds different meanings for every 
group, varies across countries, and fluctuates over time.  In order to understand 
whether or not the rising anti-American sentiment in the 21st century is new and 
different from past attitudes, I turn the analysis to the historical context of anti-
Americanism.  The next section examines the transatlantic relationship since the end 
of WWII and the role anti-American sentiment played during those years.   
 
Understanding the Relationship between the US and Europe since 1945  
In this section, the relationship between the US and Europe is closely 
examined. The Cold War forced the US to not only maintain its significant presence, 
but also intensified its military capabilities, its political clout, and its cultural influence 
throughout Western Europe.  During this period, the US and Europe developed a 
close partnership, which was widely popular on both sides of the Atlantic.  Even 
once the common enemy fell in 1989, the transatlantic relationship remained strong.  
It was not until the recent events of 9/11 and the unilateral American war on 
terrorism that the public opinion about the US turned negative.  While some scholars 
and policymakers were alarmed by this change, others argued that the negative 
feelings represented a normal trend in public opinion—three specific incidents can 
be cited during the Cold War alone. These downturns were always followed by 
significant rebounds.  However, I argue that the deeply negative attitudes in post-
9/11 public opinion are different than previous periods.  
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The Transatlantic Relationship from WWII until 1989 
As WWII ended, the Iron Curtain swiftly fell and divided Europe.  However, 
the Cold War offered a brutal stability to an exhausted continent and ensured that 
the revival of political life would take place on terms permitted by the international 
balance of power (Mazower 1998).  Both the British and the Americans reluctantly 
and privately accepted the reality of their partnership with the Russians.  Just as 
their respective militaries held Western Europe at the liberation, the Soviet army 
dominated Eastern Europe.  The Cold War quickly closed in on the former allies 
pushing each to utilize their new spheres of influence.   
Since Britain was just as economically and structurally destitute as the rest of 
the continent, the American allies stepped in with massive funds and manpower to 
help restore Western Europe.  Unlike the First World War, monies were available 
regardless of allegiance during the war.  The vast economic support of the Marshall 
Plan was widely popular and was considered the most important policy decision in 
the postwar period.  A survey taken in January 1948 revealed solid majorities 
favoring the plan: 65 percent of Italians, 60 percent of French, and 60 percent of 
British (Isernia 2007: 82).  These actions of massive funding and dedicated 
manpower greatly shaped the positive image of America for Europeans in the 
postwar period. 
Even though the Marshall Plan offered incredible benefits and played a vital 
role in the rebuilding process, the belief that the European recovery hinged solely on 
US investment was a myth (Mazower 1998).  From a purely quantitative perspective, 
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it became clear that the Marshall Plan was less important economically than its 
propagandists made out (Mazower 1998).  In fact, a majority of European 
investment was domestically generated, while growth rates in the West were no 
higher than in Eastern Europe where the countries not only lacked Marshall Plan aid, 
but also financed their superpower instead of being supported by it.  
Furthermore, European governments were not simply the passive recipients 
of American generosity.  They also effectively prevented a return to US isolationism 
by keeping the Americans in Europe with “their scare stories of the menace of 
communism.  If the Americans were imperialists, they were there ‘by invitation’” 
(Mazower 1998: 296).  Europeans welcomed the US military presence, which 
supplied the manpower for the rebuilding process and the security against the 
communist threat.  American intelligence was stationed across Europe to not only 
counter communist beliefs, but also fuel anti-communist sentiments.   
The political landscape throughout Europe leaned to the Right with the 
Communist party outlawed in Germany and Greece, and tolerated but harassed 
elsewhere.  Across Western Europe, the police and security services worked 
together with the US CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination to counter communism.  
“European governments helped the youthful CIA try out its latest theories of 
psychological warfare against the Left, attacking communism through advertising, 
cultural publishing, traveling exhibitions, and film” (Mazower 1998: 289). 
While the US intelligence focused on swaying European opinion away from 
communism, American business focused on swaying European opinion towards 
consumerism. From the early 1950s and onwards, US businesses changed their 
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tactics when marketing to Europe—they marketed the American Dream.  Europeans 
were pumped with ideas about the need for new household goods to modernize the 
home.  By changing their tactics, American advertising succeeded in creating the 
desire to purchase goods (Mazower 1998).  While the advertisers created desire, the 
economic boom generated a disposable income to make such purchases possible.  
The astounding economic growth produced a climate in which Europeans were able 
to embrace the new consumerism—often called ‘Americanization’.        
Even with all of these changes in the postwar period, the majority of 
Europeans welcomed the American presence and extolled many of its values.  Yet 
Europeans could never fully “Americanize”, because they placed a much higher 
value on protecting its citizens from the market.  Europe emphasized protective 
welfare states, while the US promoted unrestrictive “cowboy” capitalism.   
The Cold War had created an environment where a strong transatlantic 
partnership was vital for the national securities of all nation-states, opening the door 
for constant US presence and involvement.  This was paired with the new 
materialistic lifestyle provided by the economic boom and US cultural influences.   
However, there were times when the US dropped in popular opinion.  These dips 
highlighted crises in transatlantic relationship.  During the postwar and Cold War 
periods, three key incidents registered drops in positive opinion about the US: the 
Suez crisis; the Vietnam War; and, the placement of ballistic missile sites in Europe.  
 The first incident, the Suez crisis, is considered one of the most important 
crises in transatlantic history (second only to the Iraq War in 2003).   It occurred in 
late 1956, when France and Great Britain invaded Egypt to seize control of the Suez 
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Canal. The US intervened to prevent a clash with the Soviet Union and issued an 
ultimatum to France and Great Britain—withdrawal from Suez or lose all US support 
(Isernia 2007).  The French and British withdrew their forces.  This crisis 
demonstrated the vast power the US had come to hold in world affairs; Europeans 
could no longer ambitiously pursue their international objectives without asking for 
American approval.  This loss of power sparked the rising negative attitudes across 
Europe.  However, the 1960s were a period of declining anti-Americanism, 
demonstrating how positive opinions returned after the situation had been resolved.  
 The second noticeable increase in anti-American sentiment came during the 
second half of the 1960s in response to the US war in Vietnam. The US wanted to 
prevent communist expansion in the region, so the Americans offered their military 
support to South Vietnam.  For years the US poured its resources into the fight, but 
the American presence seemed to have little effect.  Throughout Europe, the failed 
US actions shattered the American dream and eventually produced intense protests 
(Mazower 1998).  These demonstrations developed into a powerful antiwar 
movement that fueled anti-American sentiments in Europe, which persisted until the 
US pulled out of Vietnam (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007c).  At the War’s 
conclusion, the positive opinions of America returned to Western Europe.   
 The third incident occurred in the early 1980s.  NATO had decided to station 
Pershing and cruise missiles, primarily in Germany, but also in other Western 
European countries, while it negotiated an arms reduction with the Soviet Union 
(Markovits 2007). The “dual track” decision provoked mass protests throughout 
Europe.  In fact, unfavorable views of the US in1982 were between 29 and 37 
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percent in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy (Katzenstein and 
Keohane 2007c).  Even more striking, a Newsweek poll from 1984 revealed that a 
plurality of respondents thought the US policies had done more to increase the risk 
of war than to promote peace.  Anti-Americanism rose during this situation; however, 
as in previous cases, the positive opinion returned once the threat had been averted. 
These three incidents illustrate the complexity of the transatlantic relationship 
during the Cold War.  Although the US and Europe formed a cohesive alliance, this 
link was not without difficulties and strains.  The important aspect of each of these 
examples was how the popular opinion rebounded following a resolution.  This 
demonstrated how negative attitudes were reactions to US foreign policies, not a 
response to key characteristics of American culture or values.  In fact, the 
Europeans adopted and even further developed typical “American” traits such as 
consumerism during the Cold War.   
The American presence had a strong political impact in Western Europe.  It 
helped rebuild the war-torn infrastructure of Western Europe and offered protection 
against the communist threat.  However, American money and security could not be 
gained without strings attached.   The recipients were forced into an inter-state 
dialogue—changing the international economic environment of Western Europe.  
Trade thrived and Europe began its “peaceful” integration (Mazower 1998).  Europe 
emerged from the postwar period as a strong economic powerhouse on the 
international stage and an essential political partner on the united Western front.   
Throughout the 20th century, the world order had become a power struggle 
between the West and the East.  The American superpower, allied with its Western 
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European partners, fought the Cold War against the Soviet superpower and its 
Soviet bloc.  Then, in 1989, the world order suddenly changed: the Berlin Wall fell, 
the Soviet Union collapsed, the Iron Curtain lifted, and the US emerged as the only 
world superpower.  
 
The Transatlantic Relationship from 1989 until 2000 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s brought a close to the 
political era in which the US needed to be tightly linked to Europe for defense; the 
common enemy no longer held the cohesive alliance together.  The US and Western 
Europe adjusted to the changing distribution of world power in order to maintain 
influence and pursue their interests (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).  In fact, the 
US wanted the EU to emerge from America’s shadow and begin exerting its 
influence in international affairs—especially in Eastern Europe.  
Instead of taking control of the post-Cold War effort in this region, the US 
deferred its objectives for Western aid to EU leadership (Featherstone and Ginsberg 
1996).  This not only offered Europe an opportunity to demonstrate its authority in 
Eastern Europe, but also demonstrated the US recognition of the EU as an 
important player on the world stage.   
This new American attitude towards the EU reflected the realities of a post-
Cold War international order (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).  The US needed to 
enlist the support of other global powers to manage economic as well as other 
spheres of international relations.  However, the US had hoped Europe would also 
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have the military strength to defend their territory and intervene within their new 
sphere of influence.     
In the early 1990s, the EU tested its military strength when it was thrown into 
the civil war conflict in Yugoslavia (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).  Although 
Europe quickly engaged in active mediation and in the dispatch of ceasefire 
monitors, no consensus could be reached to send military forces.  The lack of a 
defense policy illustrated a huge obstacle in European international influence and 
marred the EU with an embarrassing failure to contain the Balkan crisis.           
Just at a time when the EU’s international influence appeared to be rising, US 
leadership in the Yugoslav conflict highlighted the military strength of the US and the 
disunity of the EU states on a matter of vital interest to their national security 
(Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).  Despite the imbalance between the US and 
European military capabilities and global political leadership, the US recognized that 
the EU was an important and indispensable international partner—though 
underutilized and underdeveloped (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).   
Americans continued to improve relations with the EU throughout the 1990s.  
In fact, the Clinton administration openly articulated its own EU policy, which sought 
to engage it as a foreign policy partner (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996).  Even 
without the unifying elements of a common enemy, the US and Europe worked to 
maintain its cohesive partnership.    
 Despite strong efforts to maintain the close transatlantic relationship, the US 
and Europe did begin to drift apart on various issues.  On one side, the US turned its 
focus to emerging powers and potential threats in Asia.  On the other side, the 
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Europeans directed their attention to an introspective evaluation of their own 
systems.  During the 1990s, the EU took steps to consolidate and many European 
countries faced welfare state retrenchment.   
The drift5 in the post-Cold War period was not a direct reaction to a particular 
policy or incident.  Instead, the deteriorating transatlantic relationship was 
“manifested less in open confrontation than in quiet mutual alienation” (Calleo 2001: 
361).  Each side had shifted its focus to more pressing issues.  As for anti-American 
sentiment during this post-Cold War period, the popular opinions of Europeans 
remained overwhelmingly positive.  
 
The Threat of Terrorism and Changing Anti-Americanism in Transatlantic 
Relationship  
 
The slight drift in the transatlantic relationship throughout the 1990s was 
harmless, and many attributed this shift to the loss of a common enemy.  Without 
this common bond, the US and the EU were free to focus on other issues.  However, 
in the days following 9/11, America and Europe reunited.  Europeans rallied behind 
its closest ally and NATO invoked Article Five for the first time in its history.  Even 
the historically anti-American French printed an article declaring, “We are all 
Americans” (Kroes 2006).  A new common enemy pulled the transatlantic 
relationship back together—even if it only for a short period of time.   
                                                 
5 Some scholars believe the drift in the transatlantic relationship began in the 1990s.  However, this 
disputed belief is not reflected in public opinion.  It is based on diverging objectives in foreign and 
economic policies.  For example, welfare state retrenchment is cited as an example of European 
divergence from US policy, yet welfare states have been a fundamental part of all European countries 
since the end of WWII.  This leads to me to conclude, for the purpose of this thesis, that the drift is 
slight and not detrimental to the policy objectives of either side.     
  29 
Although Europe provided political and military support for the Afghan 
invasion, the EU began to rethink its involvement when the Bush administration grew 
increasingly aggressive and unilateral.  The initial feelings of goodwill were replaced 
with skepticism and even fear.  Instead of providing a unifying factor, the US-led war 
on terrorism drove a wedge into the transatlantic relationship (Peterson and Pollack 
2003).  Even more damaging was how European countries split over whether or not 
they should maintain their alliance to the US.  Some countries, such as Britain, 
followed the US into war, while others, such as France and Germany, quickly 
retreated from the transatlantic alliance.  European attitudes, as expressed in public 
opinion polls, dropped to historically low levels as a result of US policy.    
In order to understand how this recent drop in public opinion is different from 
other periods, I turn to Pierangelo Isernia’s analysis of net public opinions from the 
early years of the Cold War to the current situation with the war on terrorism.  As 
Figure 6 illustrates6, the range in variation of negative attitudes becomes wider and 
grows less stable over time.  In fact, net favorable opinion in Great Britain, France, 
West Germany, and Italy reaches the lowest levels ever in 2002. 
This figure also reveals the cyclical nature of this mood around a positive 
mean.  Even when anti-Americanism increases, Isernia stresses that each dip in 
public opinion is followed by a reversal of the trend line back towards the positive 
mean (Isernia 2007).  The declines are always followed by upswings in positive 
opinion once the incident or crises has been resolved.  However, the current drop is 
much greater and has lasted much longer than any previous decline.  
                                                 
6 In order to have a clearer picture of these fluctuations, Isernia smoothes the trend lines for the four 
countries (Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy), then plots and evaluates the general 
movement of anti-Americanism over time.  The results confirm this trend of growing fluctuations.  
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 Furthermore, even though Isernia makes a compelling argument about the 
cyclical nature of anti-Americanism, his analysis does not explain what causes public 
opinion to return back to the positive mean.  This analysis operates on the 
assumption that the majority of Europeans hold positive attitudes about the US, and 
falter only when a US policy upsets them.  With this assumption in mind, returning 
back to the positive mean has been possible throughout the Cold War and post-Cold 
War period because the overall opinion of the US remained positive.  
However, since the popularity of and the trust in Americans have recently 
disappeared, the trend line’s return to a positive mean seems less likely to occur 
without an active US effort.  If the US does not pursue strategies to improve its 
FIGURE 6 
Net Favorable Opinion of the US in Western Europe  
from 1951 to 2002 
 
Source: Isernia, Pierangelo.  (2007).  “Anti-Americanism in Europe during the Cold War”.  Pgs. 
57-92 in Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. 
Katzenstein.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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image, will popular opinion actually return to and remain at a positive level?  These 
questions are addressed in the next section, which focuses on the causes of anti-
Americanism since the beginning of the 21st century.    
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
CAUSES OF RISING ANTI-AMERICANISM 
 
The national image of a particular country is influenced by a variety of 
factors—its culture and soft power, its formal foreign policy, and its public diplomacy 
efforts. Cultural appeal and the ability to co-opt audiences through soft power act as 
more subtle methods to influence opinion.  As already noted, the global appeal of 
American popular culture infiltrates and impacts populations worldwide.  However, 
since this power remains outside the government’s control, it will not be considered 
for the purpose of this thesis.  Instead, the focus will remain on the governmental 
influencers—foreign policy and public diplomacy. Foreign policy exerts the strongest 
influence because the government states an opinion or takes an action, which 
directly affects a population.  However, without the aid of public diplomacy, which 
reaches out to a population to educate it, not only about its foreign policy, but also 
about its culture, it can be assumed that foreign policy could be viewed in a more 
negative light.  In this section, I evaluate the Bush administration’s foreign policy; 
then, I analyze his use of public diplomacy.  I argue that President Bush’s actions (or 
inactions) have created an atmosphere that breeds a new and deeper form of anti-
Americanism in Europe.      
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The Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy 
The Bush administration’s neo-conservative influence shifted not only the 
values emanating from the White House, but also the approach this administration 
would take when dealing with foreign governments.  European leaders were 
skeptical from the day Bush won the highly contested election victory in 2000, and it 
did not take long for his administration to confirm their suspicions.  Although many of 
his policies were unpopular, I have chosen to focus on three specific cases where 
the events can be linked to negative changes in public opinion: (1) the Bush 
administration’s stance on climate change; (2) its disregard for international 
organizations; and, (3) its violations of human rights.  These three cases will 
illustrate the general trend in European public opinion after 2000—resentment 
towards and dislike of America grows stronger and deeper amongst the general 
European population.  
 
Case Study #1: Environmental Issues—the US Rejects the Kyoto Protocol  
The Kyoto Protocol, which became effective February 16, 2005, is the first 
attempt to control climate change.  While the EU has committed to reducing 
emissions by 8 percent below 1990 levels, the US has refused to sign the 
agreement (Hanley 2005). Even though the US and Europe have not always agreed 
on environmental issues, the outright rejection of not only the Protocol, but also 
climate change itself outraged Europe, putting the first rift in the transatlantic 
relationship under the Bush administration.  
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 This outright rejection caused an “overwhelmingly hostile” reaction by the 
Europeans (Stephens 2001).   From the UK, the deputy prime minister stated the 
dismissal of Kyoto would put “his country’s special relationship with the US into a 
‘deep freeze’” (Stephens 2001).  The French Prime Minister denounced the 
American administration for its unilateral actions, and declared that the future of the 
EU must be a “contradistinction to the US” (Stephens 2001).  As for Germany, the 
Protocol had been at the top of the agenda for Chancellor Schröder’s visit to 
Washington the following week.  President Bush’s pronouncement that Kyoto was 
“dead” seemed to be a slap in the face for European interests since Schröder had 
written the administration just a week before stating this agreement was a key issue 
in US-EU relations (Oakley 2001).  The Swedish environment minister told the BBC 
that the only fatal flaw in the Kyoto Protocol was the US position not to take part in it.   
 The negative reaction across Europe remained chiefly within government 
circles, although some public demonstrations did occur.  These protestors accused 
Bush of “crimes against humanity and the planet” for rejecting Kyoto Protocol 
(Okonski 2001).  For example, in France, Greenpeace demonstrators boarded an oil 
tanker to stop a shipment of oil to the US.  These obvious tactics were accompanied 
with banners clearly stating their message: “Bush + Esso + Chevron + Conoco = 
Climate Killer” and “Stop Oil to Bush—Ratify Kyoto” (Okonski 2001).  As these 
protestors clearly demonstrated, Greenpeace and various other NGOs wanted the 
Bush administration to respect international agreements.   
 As for the opinions of the mass population, the European Commission 
surveyed its citizens in 2004 and discovered that climate change was the number 
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one concern for the EU-15, much greater than the concern by average Americans 
(Eurobarometer 2005).  As the Pew Global Attitudes Project revealed in 2006, a 
plurality of Americans were concerned “very little” or “not all” as compared to vast 
majorities of Europeans caring “a fair amount” and “a great deal” about the effects of 
global warming (See Figure 7).   
 
FIGURE 7 
 
Source: Pew Global Studies 2006 
 
 Europe views environmental issues differently than the US.  In a recent 
survey conducted by Transatlantic Trends in 2006, Europeans and Americans were 
asked about their threat perceptions of nine prominent international issues.  For 
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eight of the nine issues, Americans perceived higher overall threat levels than 
Europeans.  The one exception was the threat perception of global warming.  As 
Figure 8 reveals, 90 percent of Europeans found this to be a significant threat.  Even 
more striking was how this issue was among the highest perceived threats—second 
only to terrorism (Transatlantic Trends 2006).  On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
the issue of global warming was one of the lowest perceived threats for Americans.   
 
FIGURE 8 
 
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2006 
 
Clearly Europeans place a much higher value on environmental issues, while 
Americans disregard the threats of global warming.  However, it is not because they 
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disregard the value of the environment.  Instead, the lack of interest stems from the 
US administration downplaying the effects of environmental degradation and urging 
the Americans to ignore Europe’s hypersensitivity about this issue. With that being 
said, it is not surprising that very few Europeans trust the US to protect the global 
environment.  This distrust comes from Bush’s blatant statement about placing the 
US economy above environment issues such as global warming, causing many 
Europeans to view this US position as another example of American greed.     
While Europeans are placing a high importance on environmental issues, the 
Americans were moving in the opposite direction under the Bush administration’s 
leadership.  As Edmund Andrews of The New York Times noted, Europeans are 
angry the US appears oblivious to widespread environmental concerns across most 
of Europe, and frustrated that the US, by virtue of its size, can undermine a treaty 
that was negotiated by more than 100 countries (Stephens 2001).  This anger and 
frustration has led to very high disapproval ratings of US leadership on the issue of 
global warming.  
 
Case Study #2: Disregard of the UN—the US Invasion of Iraq 
The US-led invasion of Iraq occurred against the wishes of the UN Security 
Council in March 20, 2003.  The Bush administration had purported that Saddam 
Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—chemical, biological, 
and/or nuclear.  The UN had been attempting to disarm Iraq through diplomatic 
efforts and UN weapons inspectors had toured the country on dozens of occasions, 
but no solid evidence of WMDs had been found in recent years.   
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Even so, the global community, and especially the US, remained wary of the 
possibility.  While the other members of the UN Security Council wanted to continue 
inspections, the US was losing its patience.  The US made it clear that it would not 
take part in any dialogue with Saddam Hussein.  Instead, President Bush went to the 
UN General Assembly and urged the nations of the world to unite and bring an end 
to this danger.  On November 8, 2003, the Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 1441—finding Iraq in breach of its obligations (CNN 2003).  The UN 
vowed that serious consequences would result if Iraq did not fully and immediately 
disarm.  However, the UN did not want use military force in the disarmament.  
President Bush’s response: “The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to 
its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours” (CNN 2007).   
The Bush administration did not feel the need to have international backing 
for this war.  In fact, in his television and radio announcement on March 17, 2003, he 
stated: “This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will” (CNN 2003).  
According to the President, those who are willing and able had the right to act.  Soon 
thereafter, the US invades Iraq with a small contingent of coalition partners, and the 
EU splits on its support. 
 The unilateral action of the Bush administration was not well received.  From 
the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan reiterated how any military action in the 
region, which occurred without the blessing of the world body, would have its 
legitimacy questioned (CNN 2003).  Following along this same line of thinking, the 
other members of the Security Council felt as though international law had been 
abandoned.  Russian President Vladimir Putin said any possible war in Iraq would 
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be a mistake “fraught with the gravest consequences”, and would “destabilize the 
international situation in general”  (CNN 2003).  From France, the Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin, took an even more pacifist approach when he spoke on 
Europe 1 radio: “One country can win a war, but it takes more than one country to 
win a peace” (CNN 2003).  From the French Foreign Minister to the UN Secretary 
General, world leaders spoke out against the US plan.    
 
FIGURE 9 
 
Source: Pew Global Studies 2006 
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Yet the elites were not the only opponents.  Across Europe, massive 
demonstrations were organized.  In fact, on February 15, 2003, millions of 
Europeans publicly united to oppose the war in Iraq—an unprecedented event 
(Markovits 2007).  For some countries (including Germany, France, and Greece), 
these protests turned into rallies supporting the ruling government because they 
refused to join Bush’s “coalition of the willing” and fight in Iraq.  Even in states where 
the government was supporting the invasion (including Great Britain, Netherlands, 
Spain, and Italy), demonstrators protested the impending war.   
The US and its “coalition of the willing” defied the UN Security Council when it 
entered Iraq.  As time passed and the US occupation of Iraq grew more bleak, 
countries that had stayed out of the war increasingly felt this had been the right 
decision.  On the other side of the spectrum, those who had entered the war 
alongside the US increasingly felt as though their countries had made the wrong 
decisions.  Figure 9 illustrates these changing attitudes. 
 Along with declining support for the war in general, global opinion holds that 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power has not made the world a safer place 
(contrary to the Bush administration’s claims).  In fact, European majorities find the 
world to be a more dangerous place because the region has become much more 
unstable.    
President Bush considered Saddam Hussein’s regime to be an imminent 
threat to the US national security.  This message was conveyed to the media by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary 
of State Colin Powell—all claiming to have sound intelligence confirming the 
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possession of WMDs.  However, after months of fighting, it became apparent that 
Iraq did not have them.  The US had misled the world into believing Iraq was a 
greater threat in order to invade it and overthrow Saddam Hussein.  It placed its own 
foreign policy goals over the concerns of its allies and acted unilaterally.   
 
Case Study #3: Human Rights Issues—Abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and 
CIA Cells  
 
The US-led war on terrorism relies almost entirely on intelligence collected 
from terror suspects detained at Guatanamo Bay prison in Cuba, Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq, and secret CIA cells worldwide.  In order to acquire time-sensitive 
information from these detainees, the administration has authorized harsh 
treatments of prisoners amounting to physical and psychological torture. These 
abuses have been captured on amateur film and photo by the soldiers that actually 
perpetrated the acts.  After approximately two years of documented abuses at Abu 
Ghraib, the story is broken to the public by 60 Minutes and The New Yorker in the 
spring of 2004 (Kennedy 2006).   
 While the only hard evidence of torture comes from abuses at Abu Ghraib, 
reports have asserted that the techniques used in Iraq were actually perfected at 
Guantanamo.   Even more striking is the suspicion that the US is not only holding 
terror suspects in CIA cells throughout the world, but also transporting these 
detainees to countries where torture is allowed and accepted.  These human rights 
abuses have sent shockwaves throughout the world.    
 This shock can be attributed to the fact the US had actually been a global 
leader in human rights.  The US signed the Geneva Conventions in 1949 (Kennedy 
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2006).  From the US perspective, the original purpose of signing the Conventions 
was to ensure that captured American combatants would be treated with respect 
and dignity.  In fact, Americans championed these values and was a leader in 
promoting human rights.  US military history revealed that POWs in American 
custody were consistently treated at levels higher than those set forth in the Geneva 
Conventions (Kennedy 2006).  These high standards were maintained until recently.    
The recent changes occurred after the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
ushering in a new era of international relations.  Instead of nations entering and 
exiting combat with formal notices, this new enemy attacked without warning, 
targeted civilians, and had no clear link to a particular country.  The al Qaeda 
terrorists lived and trained in terror cells throughout the world.  For these reasons, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that these detainees “would not 
be treated as prisoners-of-war, because they were not.  They would be treated as 
unlawful combatants without the protection of the Geneva Conventions” (Kennedy 
2006).  This unprecedented denial of human rights protections was the Bush 
administration’s official statement.   
Even though the US did not believe al Qaeda terror suspects had rights under 
the Conventions, these detainees were still protected under the UN Convention 
Against Torture.  However, the vague and ambiguous language of the agreement 
was vulnerable to imaginative interpretation.  In fact, the Justice Department had 
been asked by the administration to manipulate the definitions of the “severe” and 
“physical pain or suffering” in order to legally allow torture (Kennedy 2006).  The 
results were astonishing.  
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Once the graphic evidence became public knowledge early in 2004, the Bush 
administration was quick to repudiate the conduct (Human Rights First 2005).  Its 
official position was that these abuses were the work of a few.  The Schlesinger 
Report stated that this sadism was not sanctioned; it was “animal house” on the 
night shift (Kennedy 2006).   
However, this theory had several problems.  First, for those with knowledge of 
interrogation techniques, the pictures at Abu Ghraib revealed the use of well-known 
methods (such as the famous picture of the prisoner standing on a box with wires 
attached to his fingers and with a hood covering his head).  This particular method, 
“the Vietnam”, had been developed by the Brazilian military (Kennedy 2006).  
Therefore, questions arise as to how uneducated soldiers were able to conceive of 
this technique without someone instructing them to use it.  
Europeans widely agree that the US government (not just the efforts of a “few 
bad apples”) had violated international law in its treatment of detainees (Kull 2006).  
The abuses have led many Europeans to change their views about the US 
government.   
Once a world leader in human rights, the US has now lost nearly all its 
credibility.  Nearly a decade ago, majorities in Great Britain and Germany would 
have stated that the US did a ‘good job’ in promoting human rights.  Figure 10 
illustrates how different the picture is today with the US considered a poor leader by 
56 percent of British and 78 percent of Germans in the area of human rights (Kull 
2006). 
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FIGURE 10 
 
Source: PIPA Globescan 2006 
 
 The combination of indefinite detention, abusive interrogations, and unfair 
military commissions makes it apparent why longstanding American allies have 
stopped supporting the US in its fight against terrorism.  In fact, the outrageous 
abuses have simply added to the negative attitudes about the US to the point of 
making pro-American stances politically toxic (Nye 2004).  Political leaders 
throughout Europe have needed to distance themselves from the US in order to 
succeed in domestic politics.    
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FIGURE 11 
 
Source: PIPA Globescan 2007 
 
Results of Unpopular Foreign Policy 
As the results from the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 
revealed in Figure 11, approval ratings for the US actions are at all time lows.  
Europeans overwhelming disapprove of how the Bush administration has 
approached global warming, the Iraq War, and human rights abuses in 
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and CIA cells.  I have chosen these three cases to 
specifically demonstrate not only how this administration has been disliked before 
9/11, but also how its resolute stances have created more negative opinions.  
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Through these actions, the Bush administration has helped to carry negative feelings 
about what America does—its foreign policy—over into what America is.      
Even before President Bush was elected, Europeans had been caricaturing 
him as the “quintessential ugly American: ignorant of world affairs, probably stupid, 
isolationist-minded, a notorious polluter and a puppet of corporate interests” 
(Stephens 2001).  His swift rejection of the Kyoto Protocol simply confirmed their 
stereotype.  Europeans were openly irritated with US, and a values gap in the 
transatlantic relationship became noticeable.  While Europeans found environmental 
issues7 to be a growing threat to the international community, Americans denied the 
existence of the problem.  
European frustration resulted in growing resolve across Europe to forge 
ahead and find a way to accomplish its goal of passing Kyoto without immediate US 
involvement.  As vocalized by the French Prime Minister, the EU needed to become 
an influential actor on the world stage—apart from the US.  The promotion of the 
Kyoto Protocol became the first opportunity to make this distinction.   
Bush provided confirmation of the Europeans’ beliefs about the “greedy 
Americans”.  It became obvious that American priorities were self-focused, when 
Bush openly asserted that he would place the US economy over any environmental 
policies.  Even worse, the unilateral decision of the US nearly crippled an agreement 
that had been negotiated by over one hundred countries for years.  The US 
                                                 
7 For the purpose of this paper, the term “environmental issues” refers specifically to climate change.  
This distinction is necessary because the US and Europe have exhibited different priorities on a 
variety of environmental issues in the past, with the US leading in some areas.  Therefore, it would be 
a gross oversimplification to state that Europe cares more about the environment when looking at 
environmental issues in a generic sense.  However, by making the term “environmental issues” 
synonymous with “global warming” and “climate change”, the statement “Europe cares more about 
environmental issues” is true.    
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disregarded the will of the international community, which was what angered the 
Europeans the most.    
However, this response across Europe was not new. Instead, as Edmund 
Andrew of The New York Times observed, the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol simply 
“aggravated a mixture of grudges that have gnawed at Europeans for years” 
(Stephens 2001).  This particular policy contributed to previously established 
negative emotions about the US.  The rising anti-American sentiment that began in 
2000 had been triggered by this foreign policy.  
Then, Bush bullied much of world into joining the “coalition of the willing”.  In 
this fight, the Bush administration believed the world fits neatly into two categories: 
those who fight terrorism alongside the US or those who are against the US and 
harbor terrorists.  Even though Europe had always been a strong ally of the US, EU 
split on the issue of invading Iraq.  The governments of Great Britain, Spain, 
Netherlands, and Italy pledged military support, but France and Germany refused to 
join.  This dissidence ignited tensions on both sides of the Atlantic.     
For most Americans, the invasion of Iraq was viewed as necessary in the fight 
against terrorism—even if no connections had been made between al Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein.  However, for most Europeans, the unilateral US invasion was 
seen as a choice—an assertion of American power in an illegitimate way (Howard 
2003).  
The Germans and especially the French were enraged by the insular views 
the US held in the fight against terrorism.  Obviously, these Europeans did not 
promote or support terrorist activities; they simply disagreed with the Bush 
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administration.  Furthermore, major argument for the American invasion was that 
Iraq had refused to follow UN Security Council resolutions.  Yet the American 
invasion, overthrow, and occupation, also disregarded the opinion of the UN. 
The Germans, French, and other Europeans who remained outside the war 
effort found themselves in opposition to an aggressive, powerful, and narrow-minded 
military force that could and would pursue its ambitious plans without adhering to 
international rulings.  In the face of such an irrational force, what influenced their 
decision to remain outside the coalition?  
Even though some would claim anti-Americanism affected their decision, 
Katzenstein and Keohane revealed that there was only a slight relationship between 
public attitudes toward the US in 2002 and the subsequent coalition membership—
average median favorability score at 72 points for members and 63 points for 
nonmembers (2007b).     
  While anti-American attitudes did not significantly affect coalition membership, 
the Iraq War devastated positive opinions across Europe.  As previously noted, the 
mean for public opinion becomes negative for the first time8.  President Bush’s 
cowboy diplomacy and use of unilateral military force enraged Europeans. 
Although the US had lost some credibility when the world discovered that Iraq 
had not been holding WMDs, the remainder of its credibility was taken once the 
events at Abu Ghraib became known.  Not only had the US defied the UN to enter 
this war, but also decided to ignore Geneva Conventions.  The world community 
could no longer view the US as a champion of freedom and democracy.   
                                                 
8 The negative average was revealed in Figure 1 of this thesis.  Even though popular opinion had 
declines over time, it did not become negative until 2002.  This is not be confused with the dips in net 
attitudes as revealed by Isernia in Figure 6.   
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Negative feelings permeated the European assessment of the US at this time. 
Therefore, when the news about human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib surfaced, 
Europeans were not shocked, just appalled by the blatant disregard for human life.  
Even though a direct connection to the administration’s orders had not been made, 
most of Europe blamed these abuses on Bush.   
All of the negative attitudes and opinions had the potential to turn from dislike 
into biases against the US.  If that were to occur, Europeans would first associate 
the US with unilateral actions, disregard for international law, and now, appalling 
human rights abuses, before any other positive connection could be made.  While no 
evidence indicated that European negative opinion had turned into systematic 
biases, the situation at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and CIA cells throughout the world 
only added to the levels of distrust.     
 Since his inauguration, the Bush administration has raised eyebrows across 
Europe.  With each passing policy, the skepticism turns into annoyance, which 
grows into anger.  The negative opinions about Americans rise to unprecedented 
levels.  Yet even though anti-American sentiment reaches an all-time high, most 
scholars assert that these attitudes will not leave a lasting impression in Europe over 
time.  As noted by Isernia, negative trends downward have always been followed by 
equally positive upward turns.  It is simply too early to confirm this full cycle.  
However, since the distrust has deepened and strengthened for nearly a decade 
across Europe, the departure of Bush will not have a huge impact on public opinion.  
In order for the upward turn to be completed, the US will need to do more than elect 
a new leader and make popular foreign policy.  It will also need to regain its soft 
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power. This next section focused on American efforts to promote a positive image of 
the US through public diplomacy efforts—boosting public opinion worldwide.  
 
Public Diplomacy Efforts 
Public diplomacy seeks to understand, inform, engage, and influence all types 
of foreign societies, whether friendly, hostile, or wavering, through a variety of 
information, culture, education, and advocacy programs. It reaches these audiences 
through radio, newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, television, and now Internet 
blogs, sms messaging, and chatrooms.  It should not be propaganda or attempt to 
coerce; it should be objective and deal with facts and figures.  Public diplomacy 
offers the necessary tools—information and personal experiences—to allow a 
foreign population to form its own opinion about a country, its government, and its 
people.        
The United States had been using public diplomacy efforts since before 
WWII; however, these efforts became a fundamental tool during the Cold War.  In 
this period, US public diplomacy focused on three main objectives: conveying 
objective facts on issues; promoting the US government’s position on those issues; 
and, facilitating positive experiences with US.  These objectives were achieved 
through the independently-operated United States Information Agency (USIA).  To 
many officials, public diplomacy efforts were considered to be just as valuable as 
military strategy in the fight against communism.   
Once the Cold War ended, preserving the extensive public diplomacy 
apparatus seemed unnecessary. In 1999, the USIA was dismantled, and the 
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independent nature of US public diplomacy ceased to exist.  Many public diplomats 
foresaw public diplomacy efforts taking the back burner its new home—the 
Department of State.  
The major source of this fear was driven by large contrasts in the structure 
and purpose of public diplomacy and foreign policy.  On one hand, public diplomacy 
efforts are driven by the needs of the overseas posts and focus on exchange 
programs in order to promote mutual understanding between two cultures.  On the 
other hand, foreign policy is driven by the needs of the Secretary of State and 
focuses on the promotion of the policy in the traditional, over-centralized, and 
hierarchical institutional structure (Kramer 2000).  While every public diplomacy 
effort functions as a bottom-up approach by customizing its message to a specific 
region and culture in its language, foreign policy promotion functions in a more top-
down approach spreading a cohesive message about the US government 
throughout the world to all world and community leaders. 
In order for public diplomacy to maintain the same effectiveness it had while 
under the independent USIA agency, the public diplomacy officers and the State 
Department’s foreign and civil service officers will have to learn how to function 
together. Yet even if these adaptations prove successful, the major difference in 
leadership remains problematic.  Both the foreign policy and public diplomacy efforts 
would be under the control of a politically-appointed partisan leader.  While having a 
Secretary of State promote the foreign policy of the elected administration continues 
to be vital to the cohesive and unified promotion of foreign policies, having this same 
leader control the public diplomacy efforts taints the efforts with partisan attitudes.  
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An independently directed public diplomacy agency remains outside criticisms of the 
particular administration—allowing it to continue to produce unbiased materials, offer 
broadcasts, and operate exchanges while maintaining its credibility.9  
 
FIGURE 12 
US Government Expenditures on Public Diplomacy 
FY 1980-2007 
                
Source: Epstein, Susan B. (2006).  “U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission 
Recommendations” in CRS Report for Congress, Updated May 1, 2006.   
 
                                                 
9 The discussion of unbiased materials specifically refers to the ability of an independent agency, 
such as the former USIA, to more easily stay out of party politics.  Obviously, materials produced by 
such an agency would carry biases for the US government, culture, and/or American way of life.  
However, remaining outside the direct influence of partisan politics allows the public diplomacy efforts 
to simply focus on promoting greater American attributes and values.  Meanwhile, the State 
Department and the Secretary of State closely follow the elected administration’s political, and often 
partisan, views when promoting foreign policies.  For example, regardless of an administration’s 
specific policy towards the former Soviet Union, the public diplomacy efforts between the US and the 
USSR promoted cultural understanding of each other’s ways of life and pushed for meaningful 
exchanges between scholars and researchers.  Although foreign policy tactics changed with 
administrations, the overall objectives of public diplomacy throughout the Cold War remained the 
same.   
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 In the post-Cold War period, public diplomacy not only lost its independence, 
but also took a huge funding cut.  While this seemed reasonable during the peaceful 
post-Cold War era, it was surprisingly maintained after the attacks of September 
11th.   In fact, public diplomacy funding levels in FY2000, FY2001, and FY2002 
dropped below FY1980 levels (Epstein 2006). The lack of attention to these efforts 
could be a confluent factor in the rising anti-American sentiment worldwide. 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the end of WWII, the prevalence and salience of anti-Americanism has 
waxed and waned across Europe.  Historically, Europeans have not held this 
attitude, reserving it for only a small portion of the population—mostly elites.  
However, the turn of 21st century has brought a turn in public opinion.  Europeans 
are finding the US and Americans unfavorable and untrustworthy.  What could have 
caused this shift, and is this change different from previous changes public opinion? 
As the results of Transatlantic Trends opinion polls indicate in Figure 13, 
President Bush is, by far, the greatest contributor to the growing anti-American 
sentiment in Europe.  His unilateral foreign policies and disregard of international 
governing bodies have enraged not only European elites, but also the masses.  This 
outrage reaches deep into public opinion, and has lasted much longer than previous 
periods of negative attitudes.  The depth and longevity of current distrust creates a 
problem for the future effectiveness of US foreign policy.  Even after President Bush 
leaves office and public opinion has an opportunity to rebound, Europeans will no 
longer embrace Americans as close allies.  Instead, the transatlantic partnership will 
mature and each side will become more autonomous.  
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FIGURE 13  
 
Source: Transatlantic Trends 2007 
 
Evidence of this change comes from the Bush administration’s widely 
unpopular foreign policies.  It has shown deliberate disregard for the environment by 
rejecting the Kyoto Protocol; it united an enraged Europe by overstepping the UN to 
invade Iraq; and, it shocked the world with its policies for inhumane treatment of 
detainees at US prisons.  In the past, the US had worked along side Europe to 
promote environmental issues, strengthen international organizations, and champion 
human rights.   However, the Bush administration has not only broken away from 
this strong working relationship, but has also become the greatest adversary for all 
three issues.   
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Further evidence comes from the Bush administration’s stance on public 
diplomacy.  It compounded the problem of growing negative opinion by ignoring 
public diplomacy efforts. Instead of these efforts playing a fundamental role in the 
ambiguous war on terrorism, the administration focused on high levels of military 
spending and military might to combat the threat.  Yet even the best marketing plans 
and public relations schemes cannot sell unpopular ideas.  Given that the Bush 
administration’s foreign policies have proven to be widely detested, it must be 
assumed that even extensive and elaborate public diplomacy could not have turned 
the overwhelming disapproval into approval—but these efforts would not have hurt 
public opinion.  
Finally, the current reaction contrasts previous responses.  The current 
unpopular foreign policy issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Iraq War, and the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, have not only registered strong negative reactions, but also 
occurred consecutively.  Coupled with low public diplomacy efforts, the public 
opinion has had little time and no help in rebounding.  Previous downturns in US 
popularity were always followed by significant upswings; however, these incidents 
were typically isolated and active public diplomacy efforts helped turn the negative 
attitudes back into positive opinions.   
Looking towards the future, Europe has already begun moving forward with 
new leaders making an effort to rebuild the transatlantic relationship. However, even 
though these heads of government are making great strides, the majority of 
Europeans continue to distrust American involvement in world affairs.  This marks an 
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interesting shift in anti-American sentiment—the European elites view the US more 
positively than the European masses.   
Even more significant, these levels of distrust will not diminish drastically once 
President Bush leaves office.  Instead, the next administration will be forced to catch 
up with the Europeans in their effort to rebuild trust—a daunting challenge that will 
be difficult for Republicans and Democrats alike.  The next administration will have 
to not only pursue sound foreign policy that considers the interests of its allies, but 
also revamp the American public diplomacy efforts to restore America’s soft power.   
After a half a century of close consultations in the transatlantic relationship, 
the Bush administration pushed Europeans out of the partnership.  Or perhaps, the 
Europeans turned their backs on the Americans.  Regardless of how one chooses to 
view the situation, the US and Europe have drifted apart.  Even though they share 
common interests and goals, fear common threats and enemies, and pursue 
democracy and free markets, Europe no longer relies on the US as it has in the past.  
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